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Can the Accommodationist Achieve Pluralism?
Lisa Shaw Royt
In March of 2008, Seattle University School of Law hosted an en-
gaging conference on Pluralism, Religion, and the Law. The theme of
the conference—religion and pluralism—is not only unavoidable but is
probably one of the most important issues of our times. This  paper is
based on my brief remarks on a panel dedicated to "reimagining the rela-
tionship between religion and law" and focuses on the U.S. Supreme
Court's church and state jurisprudence. I n  particular, I ask whether an
approach to the Establishment Clause known as accommodation is con-
sonant with the larger concept of pluralism, particularly in the context of
public religious symbols and displays, and offer some proposals and ten-
tative conclusions. I  propose two alternatives, signs and disclaimers, and
tentatively conclude that the use of either might relieve the perceived
tension between accommodation and pluralism.
I. WHY VIEW PLURALISM THROUGH AN ACCOMMODATIONIST LENS?
First, the easy question: What is meant by the term pluralism? I t  is
a (relatively) easy question because most of us have a sense of what plu-
ralism means. Webster's defines pluralism as, among other things, "a
state of society in which members of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, or
social groups maintain an autonomous participation in and development
of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines of a
common civilization." I n  fact, to recite this definition is to do no more
than simply make an observation about society as we know it. But  the
common civilization identified in the last part of that definition seems to
be at odds with the society described in the first part, particularly in the
case of religion. A t  the point at which we begin to recognize a common
religious character we are confronted by the danger that e pluribus unum
t Jessie D. Puckett, Jr., Lecturer and Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of
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1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 955 (11th ed. 2005).
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("out of many, one"), will become an oppressive state-sanctioned estab-
lishment of religion. Thus, the conventional wisdom has been that plu-
ralism requires a strict separation of church and state, or perhaps neutral-
ity between religion and nonreligion, and not a more flexible religious
accommodation,
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It might seem strange, then, to think o f  pluralism in terms o f
whether an accommodationist approach to the Establishment Clause can
chieve it. There are very practical reasons for looking at these two ideas
together. The current composition of the U.S. Supreme Court suggests
that the general trend for Establishment Clause cases is toward acknowl-























































with a rich religious vibrancy that reflects the religious pluralism of the
populace, and they therefore likely would argue that there is no dishar-
mony at all.
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turalists appreciate the connection between religion and identity, multi-
Culttiralists would tend to view majority manifestations of religion with.-
distrust, perhaps viewing them as -symbols of dominance rather than -as--












































































2, "Accoinmodation" refers to an approach to the Religion Clauses that values individual reli-
gious practice:, the autonomy of religious groups, and the presence of  religion in public l &  See
generally Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV.I  (1985). As
discussed ;a this paper, accommodation in the Establishment Clause context refers to an approach
that is less likely to find public manifestations of religion unconstitutional.
_ 3 ,  See, eg Erwin Chemerinsky, The Wren Cross Controversvs Religion and the Public Uni-
versiou Why Church and State Should Be Separcue, 49 Wm. & MAR Y L, REV. 2193, 2206 (201,18),
4. The ttvo most recent additions to the Court, Chief lusticc Roberts and Justice Ali t°, seem
poised to continue t h e
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From Religion Fund., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
5. CI McConnell, supra note 2, at 14 ("An alternative view is that religion is a welcome ele-
ment in the mix of beliefs and associations present in the community. Under this view, the emphasis
is placed on freedom of choice and diversity among religious opinion. ' the nation is understood not
as secular but as pluralistic.. T h e  idea of accommodation of religion, which is foreign to interpre-
tations,of the Religion Clauses based on strict neon-ditty or separation, follow's naturally from the
pluralist titirlerstanding), lvicConnell's article ultimately focuses on legislative accommodations;
he acloow ledges that rsonabie minds may differ on 'whether permitting certam religious symbols
such as the Nativity creche in the public square "nints] counter to the ideal of religious pluralism."
i d at 49-50; see also Michael W, McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Be-
sponse So thC Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 685, 687 (1992) (excluding from discussion religious
display and symbols cases and referring to t.hG se cases as involving "collective expressioil of reli-
gious ideae)i:
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ACCOMMODATION AND PLURALISM: SYMBOLS AND DISPLAYS
In the case of religious symbols and displays, the multiculturalist's
concerns are reflected in the doctrinal skepticism about the compatibility
of accommodation and pluralism. A  prominent example is the line of
U.S. Supreme Court cases involving holiday displays and featuring Jus-
tice O'Connor's endorsement test that focuses on whether a citizen is
made to feel like an "outsider."
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strife and divisiveness in the 2005 Ten Commandments case also seem to
reflect such skepticism!
To appreciat  these concerns, one need only consider an example
from the current overabundance of  reality television. The Home and
Garden Television Network features several shows in which homeown-
ers attempt to market their homes for sale. Realtors and professional
home "stagers" offer advice to anxious sellers on how to improve the
chances of a speedy and profitable sale, and the standard advice with re-
spect to family pictures is to remove them from the home. These home-
selling experts reason that removing family pictures allows prospective
purchasers to envision themselves in the house. B y  contrast, leaving
family pictures on display reminds potential buyers that the home be-
longs to someone else and prevents them from making the kind of per-
sonal connection that could lead to a quick offer to buy. I n  the same
way, the argument goes, a citizen who observes a religious symbol or
display that does not represent either her beliefs or the sub-community to
which she belongs is made to feel that she is not a full part of the larger
community.
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clude, wh re possible, more religious symbols, including symbols of mi-
nority faiths. This general approach has been met with approval by the
U.S. Supreme Court.
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is one way to solve the problem, it is not always feasible in every public
6. The endorsement test first appeared in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Don-
nelly, and the test asks whether the government action "sends a message to nonadherents that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
7 See, e.g. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[The Re-
ligion Clauses] seek to avoid the divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict,
sapping the strength of government and religion alike."). Justice Breyer cast the deciding vote in
favor of the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments monument in Van Orden and against the
constitutionality of the monument in McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
8. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (hold-
ing a crèche display in a county building unconstitutional, but finding constitutional a Christmas tree
and menorah on the county courthouse steps).
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setting to include many different religious symbols.
m I t  a l s o  f o l l o w s  
l o g -
ically that even the most inclusive display would probably fail to be in-
clusive of every religion or creed represented in a given community.
M. DISCLAIMERS AND SIGNS
Increased effort at inclusive religious representation is one tool with
which to promote pluralism, but in the cases in which such an effort is
not possible or practical, the issue for the accommodationist pluralist re-
mains whether it is possible to avoid the exclusionary message perceived
by some when confronted with religious symbols. O n  this particular
point Noah Feldman in his book, Divided by God, concludes that the an-
swer is yes": "Talk can always be reinterpreted, and more talk can al-
ways be added, so religious speech and symbols need not exclude."
12Two forms of explanatory "talk" that I propose here are disclaimers and
signs. A  disclaimer might accompany a particular display or symbol to
explain the social or historical significance of the symbol. A  sign, on the
other hand, could contain a general statement about the openness of the
community concerning religion.
The Supreme Court has not squarely considered this first idea, that
a disclaimer accompanying a religious display would remove or lessen
any concerns about the Establishment Clause. I n  its first Ten Com-
mandments case, the Court ruled that a legislative statement contained at
the bottom of the display concerning the historical significance of the
Ten Commandments could not override the religious purpose of posting
them in a schoolhouse.
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10. The facts of  th  Court's 2008-2009 Ten Commandments case, for  example, illustrate a
situation in which a minority religion's proposed symbol conflicts with the existing one, not simply
because it represents an obscure faith, but because i t proposes an alternative interpretation of  the
same religious narrative. See Summum v. Pleasant Grove City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007),
cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (2008); The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments,
http://www.summumus/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (last visited Nov. 10,2008)  (explain-
ing that Moses first received the Aphorisms of Summum on tablets at Mount Sinai as a "higher law"
prior to returning to Mount Sinai to obtain the tablets containing the Ten Commandments, or "lower
law").
11. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD (2005). Feldman reaches a conclusion that I have
reached previously, though in his case with far less handwringing. See Lisa Shaw Roy, The Estab-
lishment Clause and the Concept of Inclusion, 83 OR. L. REV. I (2004). Compare, e.g., id at 39-40
(discussing the Jehovah's Witnesses' desire to be exempted from the pledge rather than to eliminate
the practice altogether), with FELDMAN, supra, at 242 ("The Jehovah's Witnesses never claimed that
their conscientious scruples required that the pledge and salute be abolished for everyone — they just
wanted their children to be exempt.")
12. FELDMAN, supra note 11, at 238 (2005). Feldman proposes that the way to bridge the di-
vide between "Legal Secularists" and "Values Evangelicals" is to flip the Supreme Court's Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine such that public religious symbols would not violate the Establishment
Clause, but public funding for religious institutions would. Id. at 238-42.
13. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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Donnelly a few years earlier, he seemed to approve of a crèche on federal
park land adjacent to the White House because that display contained
"explanatory plaques" designed to disclaim government sponsorship and
downplay religious differences.
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the erection of a display or symbol must not have a religious purpose, but
bey nd that, particularly in the case of long-standing historical symbols
or displays, it is not clear what constitutional effect a disclaimer would
have.
15 As for signs with targeted messages intended to convey religious
pluralism, there is even less guidance as to whether such a novel ap-
proach would pass constitutional muster. A  2006 National League of
Cities initiative challenged American cities and towns to promote inclu-
siveness by posting signs in prominent places in their cities that read,
"Welcome. We are Building an Inclusive Community."
I6 O n e  c o u l dimagine a city sign f cused on religious pluralism that read, similarly,
"Welcome. We are building an inclusive community of diverse religions,
faiths, and creeds. There are no outsiders here."" As  with the explicit
disclaimer, no Supreme Court cases address the issue of whether a com-
munity may use signs to control the religious message it sends—or does
not send. However, unlike the disclaimer, which in some cases might
merely describe the historical significance of a symbol or display, the
sign is an attempt by a community to define itself on religious terms.
Even if  the sign did not affect the interpretation of a particular religious
symbol as exclusionary or welcoming, the sign itself would be subject to
constitutional scrutiny. A  court might consider a sign to have been ani-
mated either by a secular purpose, to promote pluralism and diversity, or
by a religious one, to immunize a particular religious symbol from con-
stitutional challenge. Practically, too, the strategy is one of high poten-
tial reward and correspondingly high risk. I t  is conceivable that some
citizens would not tolerate explicit messages about religion and that oth-
ers would resent such overt efforts at pluralism.
14.465 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In discussing the case involving federal
park land, Brennan compared the display in Lynch, noting that the town of Pawtucket "made no
effort whatever to provide a similar cautionary message." Id. (distinguishing Allen v. Morton, 495
F.2d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam)).
15. Compare, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (religious purpose
evident from evolution of  displays containing Ten Commandments), with Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677 (2005) (long-standing monument in Texas capitol merely an acknowledgment of religion
that does not violate the Establishment Clause).
16. Several cities joined and have adopted the signs. Haya El Nasser, Small Indiana Town
Singing Tune of Racial, Ethnic Harmony, USA TODAY, Aug. 4, 2006, at 3A; see also Lisa Shaw
Roy, Religion and Inclusion: The Impact of Signs, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 26, 2007, at Col. 1.
17. Roy, Religion and Inclusion, supra note 16.
366 S e a t t l e  University Law Review [ V o l .  32:361
With all of this in mind, let us return to the example of the home
sellers and the impact of their family pictures on potential buyers. This
example helps us understand the perspective of the potential buyer, but it
does not necessarily correspond to the reality of shared public space. A
potential buyer expects to make the home her own; she will not have to
share it with a larger community. Likewise, once he is in his new home,
an owner likely feels no obligation to establish a sense of continuity with
or historical connection to the home's previous occupants. Perhaps a
better example might be one that comes from my own institution: our
law school's main floor has a hallway featuring pictures of each graduat-
ing law school class, from the earliest up to the most recent. The pictures
spread across one long corridor divided in the center by an entrance to
the law library. O n  one end of the hall are class pictures that feature
mostly white males, with few persons of color and few women. A t  the
other end of the hall, the pictures become more diverse. How should a
law school ensure that both sides of the hall make all students feel wel-
come? One possibility would be to remove the older class pictures and
replace them with artwork, current pictures of  students or faculty, or
other historical information. But  a better alternative would be to retain
the older class pictures, and use additional images and/or text to convey
that the law school embraces all students regardless of race or gender or
other defining characteristics.
In fact, for either disclaimers or signs, the real test is whether such
ideas would succeed in practice. Success would likely depend on such
considerations as whether in a given community a relationship of trust
and good faith already exists between religious communities and gov-
ernment, and between citizens of different faiths and of no faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accommodation and pluralism are not always thought to go hand in
hand, but neither does this observation mean that the accommodationist
seeking to promote pluralism is doomed to failure. In  the case of public
religious symbols and displays, the possibility of disclaimers and signs
may potentially reconcile the interests of both accommodationists and
pluralists. Though the constitutional status of such messages is unclear,
as mentioned earlier, the Court's doctrine is likely to move in the direc-
tion of  accommodation except in cases involving egregious Establish-
ment Clause violations, so that uncertainties might be expected to be re-
solved in the accommodationist's favor. Whether disclaimers or signs
succeed in practice is another matter, but the accommodationist would
argue that either is worth a try.
